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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EFFECT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Despite the public demand for a reasonable administration of
criminal law without reliance on subversive technicalities to de-
feat that end, the New York Court of Appeals recently decided
that the writ of habeas corpus could be invoked to liberate a
person who had been found guilty by a jury after an impartial
trial because the trial judge had entered a void judgment, and,
as a result thereof, denied the state the right to prosecute the
defendant again.1
The case in question arose under the following circumstances:
Meyer was charged with disorderly conduct and tried before a
police magistrate and a jury. The trial commenced on Saturday
and ended on Sunday at which time he was found guilty by the
jury and sentenced on that same day to a term of thirty days
in the county jail. Thereafter he applied for a writ of habeas
corpus and was released. He was then ordered to stand trial
for the second time charged with the same offense based upon the
same information. Before the second trial commenced, however-
he applied for a second writ of habeas corpus and was released
on the ground that such second trial, if held, would subject him
to double jeopardy. The state appealed to the Appellate Division
which reversed the order granting the second writ, and relator
Meyer then appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the
-14 TV--. - d affirmed the order of the. Speeial Term
discharging the relator.
In deciding that the second writ should be awarded, the major-
ity of the court pointed out in its opinion that: (1) the first
judgment, having been rendered on Sunday, was void; (2) that
the defendant had been placed in jeopardy by the first trial
through its lawful commencement despite its illegal outcome;
and (3) therefore the second trial would have been in contraven-
tion of the defendant's constitutional rights had it been held, and
the second writ was proper to prevent such second trial. A strong
dissenting opinion was written by Finch, J., in which he crit-
icized the action of the majority in extending habeas corpus into
this new field and pointed out that the defendant could well
have secured a writ of error against the first judgment, and, had
1 People ex rel. Meyer v. Warden of Nassau County Jail et al., 269 N. Y.
426, 199 N. E. 647 (1936).
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he done so, he would have been in no position to urge that the
former judgment had placed him in jeopardy.2
The majority opinion cites several New York cases, but only
one is germane to the issue-that of People ex rel. Stabile v.
Warden of City Prison of City of New York,3 where the first
trial of the defendant came to a conclusion through the action
of the trial judge in improperly discharging the jury before it
had had time to agree or disagree upon a verdict.4 It was there
held, over the dissenting opinion of two judges, that the defend-
ant could no longer be held in custody to await a second trial,
since such second trial, as a matter of law, would have violated
the defendant's constitutional guarantee. Expressions in the
other cases relied upon by the majority of the court criticize the
use of habeas corpus to secure the discharge of persons who have
been found guilty by juries after having been accorded fair and
impartial trials.5
Analyzing the opinion in the case in question, it is to be noted
that two points are made. The first pertains to the invalidity of
the original judgment and the defendant's right to secure relief
against detention thereunder. This judgment was, in fact, void,
since Sunday is generally treated as dies non juridicus and no
judicial act may be performed thereon,6 though this does not
apply to merely ministerial acts such as receiving the verdict and
discharging the jury,7 or giving bond." It is also correctly as-
2 Gerard v. People, 4 I11. 362 (1842) ; Bedel v. People, 73 Ill. 320 (1874)
Phillips v. People, 88 Ill. 160 (1878).
3 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911).
4 This is one of the recognized grounds of asserting that defendant is en-
titled to claim his constitutional privilege on the theory that had the jury
been permitted to deliberate they presumably would have acquitted the de-
fendant. In this case the jury stood ten to two for acquittal at the time of its
discharge.
5 King v. People, 5 Hun 297 (N. Y. 1875); People ex rel. Brinkman v.
Barr, Warden, 248 N. Y. 126, 161 N. E. 444 (1928).
6 Baxter v. People, 8 Il. 368 (1846). Defendant was tried and found
guilty of murder by verdict of jury returned on Sunday. The trial court, on
the same day, sentenced defendant to be executed. Held, judgment void and
reversed with directions to enter judgment on legal day. The reporter ap-
pends this note: "The legislature, soon after this decision was pronounced,
passed an act changing the punishment in this case from death to imprison-
ment in the Penitentiary for life, should the plaintiff in error at the next
term of the Warren Circuit Court, after sentence was again passed upon him,
assent to such change. His assent was given at the time stated." Quaere as
to the validity of such legislative interference with the judicial branch of the
government.
7 Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368 (1846).
8 Johnston v. People, 31 Ill. 469 (1863).
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serted that detention under a void judgment is ground for dis-
charge on habeas corpus,9 although the cases so holding have gen-
erally been cases where the judgment was void because the court
had no jurisdiction to try the offense,' 0 or the sentence imposed
was outside of the court's power.11 Because the judgment was
void we may assume that the court was technically right in grant-
ing the first writ, but it should be remembered that the writ of
habeas corpus ought not be made to operate as a writ of error, 12
hence the defendant is generally compelled to utilize the latter
method of correcting the illegal judgment and is then barred
from claiming that double jeopardy exists as he has removed that
jeopardy by his own acts and is therefore said to waive his con-
stitutional right. 18 In fact, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
decided that if the only error made was in the rendition of a
void judgment after an impartial trial and verdict of guilty, then
the only action to be taken by that court on writ of error would
be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand
the case for the sole purpose of entering a valid judgment. 14
Attempts, moreover, have been made to distinguish the right to
the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it should be granted
only where the invalidity of the judgment arises from lack of
jurisdiction,15 and not where the court having jurisdiction had
acted erroneously in its proceedings.' 6 In the latter group of
cases it is recognized that the petition for habeas corpus will
not lie, but defendant may have recourse only to a writ of error
with its attendant consequence and that, after reversal at de-
fendant's request, the former jeopardy had disappeared; while
in the former group, since the court never had jurisdiction of
the defendant, he has never been in jeopardy and so he may
clearly be tried by the proper tribunal. It must also be noted
that the effect of the writ of habeas corpus is merely to discharge
9 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 65, sec. 22, clause 1.
10 Campbell v. People, 109 Ill. 565 (1884); Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill. 507,
63 N. E. 144 (1902).
11 People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918);
People ex rel. Miller v. Denemark, 354 Ill. 34, 187 N. E. 809 (1933).
12 People ex rel. Georgetown v. Murphy, 202 Ill. 493, 67 N. E. 226 (1903);
People ex rel. Wayman v. Zimmer, 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529 (1911).
1 See footnote 2.
14 Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368 (1846) ; People v. Coleman, 251 Ill. 497, 96
N. E. 239 (1911).
15 Campbell v. People, 109 Ill. 565 (1884); Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill.
507, 63 N. E. 144 (1902) ; People ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80
N. E. 291 (1907), jurisdiction lost by failure to prosecute in apt time.
26 People ex rel. Wayman v. Zimmer, 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529 (1911).
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the person detained from custody and not from the penalty,
hence usually does not operate as an acquittal and is no bar to
a subsequent indictment.17 The mere fact of the granting of the
first petition for habeas corpus in the case under consideration,
therefore, should not in and of itself be a bar to further pro-
ceedings.
Some thought must also be given to the second point made by
the decision, that is, that a second trial of this defendant upon
the same charge would place him in double jeopardy in viola-
tion of his constitutional right. The earlier New York case relied
upon has already been referred to,'8 and the language thereof
does justify the present court's conclusion that, as a matter
of law, by virtue of precedent in New York at least, double
jeopardy existed in the instant case. The dissenting opinion
suggests that this is extending the constitutional guarantee of the
defendant beyond its proper scope, inasmuch as it had formerly
been restricted to cases wherein either the jury had been im-
properly prevented by the trial judge from arriving at a verdict
which might have been in favor of the defendant, 19 or where
the defendant had been acquitted on the former trial.20 Such a
view is justified by the decisions of Illinois and by those of other
states. It has even been carried by some states to the point where
the defendant is denied.the privilege of subsequently raising the
question of former jeopardy where he has been released from
custody on habeas corpus on the ground that the first judgment
was void, such courts holding that the petition for habeas corpus
and the decision thereon at defendant's request operates to waive
the question of former jeopardy by showing its non-existence just
as it would have had defendant sought a writ of error.2 1 There
is a possible limitation of this view where the convicted defend-
ant has satisfied the legal part of an excessive, and therefore void,
sentence.
22
17 16 C. J. 257 and authorities there noted.
18 Footnote 3.
19 Writ of habeas corpus based on claim of double jeopardy will be denied
where mistrial is declared for a legal cause, People v. Peplos, 340 I1. 27, 117
N. E. 54 (1930) ; or by consent of defendant, People v. Simos, 259 Ill. App.
253 (1930).
20 Stoltz v. People, 5 Ill. 168 (1843); Durham v. People, 5 Ill. 172
(1843) ; Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 41 L. Ed. 300
(1895).
21 State ex rel. Cacciatore v. Drumright, 116 Fla. 586, 156 So. 721 (1934).
See also annotated cases on this point in 97 A. L. R. 154.
22 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 65, sec. 21, clause 2; People ex rel.
Maglori v. Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918).
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In deciding as it has, the New York Court of Appeals appears
to have relied too strongly on the language of the text-writers
that "jeopardy exists wherever a valid trial has commenced"
without examining the precedents upon which such statements
are grounded,23 and as a consequence has placed itself in the
legally correct (for that state) but fundamentally unsound posi-
tion of according to the properly convicted, guilty defendant
another way by which to thwart justice. To refuse the law
enforcing agencies a new trial and to set free the defendant
for the reason that his astute counsel has employed one form
of procedure, namely, habeas corpus, rather than another,
namely, writ of error, is to place form and technicality above
substance.
W. F. ZACHARIAS
VALIDITY OF TRANSFER OF STOCK CERTIFICATES AS DETERMINED
BY LAW AT THEIR SITUS
Will the capacity to make a valid conveyance of corporate
stocks evidenced by stock certificates, be determined by the
domicile of the owner or by the situs of the certificates at the
time the attempted transfer takes place ?
This question arose in Hutchison v. Ross et al.,' a case repre-
senting the modern trend of opinion. In Quebec, where com-
munity property law.exists, John Ross, a resident of that prov-
ince, made an antenuptial agreeiiieiit by wich- he agreed to
establish a trust fund of .$125,000 for his prospective wife. By
the law of Quebec, the provisions of such an agreement may not
be abrogated, modified, or enlarged after the marriage. Sub-
sequent to the marriage Ross inherited an estate of about $10,-
000,000. He desired then to make better provision for his wife,
and so made a trust agreement with the Equitable Trust Com-
pany in New York to establish a fund of $1,000,000 for her.
Securities were delivered in New York to the bank as trustee.
Among the securities were certificates of stocks, which were
assigned to the bank. Some ten years later, after Ross had lost
his fortune, he brought suit to have the trust declared void ab
initio on the ground, among others, that the transfer of property
for his wife was prevented by the law of Quebec. It was his con-
tention that the intangibles, such as stock, had their situs at his
domicile, under the old maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, and
hence the validity of their transfer was governed by the law of
23 Bishop on Criminal Law (9th ed.), I, 752, sec. 104, sub. 5.
1 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933).
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his domicile. The court rejected this view and held that the
transfer was valid under the law of New York.
In Schmidt v. Perkins2 the court said: "The title to tangible
personal property is ordinarily governed by the law of its situs.
The maxim, mobilia personam sequuntur, states a mere fiction of
law which it is sometimes necessary to apply in order to do jus-
tice, but it ought not to be extended beyond that necessity."
Lees et al. v. Harding Whitman and Company8 states the gen-
eral rule to be that an assignment of a movable, giving a good
title according to the law of the country where the movable is
situated at the time of the assignment, is valid. This has been
the general rule in England since 1860. In support of the rule
stated the court said: "The rule which looks to the law of the
situs has the merit of adopting the law of the jurisdiction which
has the actual control of the goods, and the merit of certainty."
In more recent years there has appeared a trend toward apply-
ing the same rule to such intangibles as are evidenced by a writ-
ing which, in mercantile transactions, must itself be transferred
in order to effect a transfer of the right it evidences. The share
of stock represents the interest of the shareholder in the corpora-
tion and is personal property in the nature of a chose in action.4
The certificate itself may be regarded as property apart from
the corporate entity and the interest of the shareholder. This
is the so-called "mercantile theory" which regards the stock
certificate as property in itself with a situs at the place where it
exists, and it represents the modern trend of policy.5
This theory is not only logical, but is also adaptible to modern
conditions in which we find the reason for its present existence.
This was well expressed in Lockwood v. U. S. Steel Corporation.6
There the court said: "The maxim nwbilia sequuntur personam
is based upon a legal fiction and has proved most useful in de-
termining the right of succession to personal property; but in
modern times 'since the great increase in the amount and
variety of personal property not immediately connected with
the person of the owner, that rule has yielded more and more
to the lex situs, the law of the place where the property is kept
and used.'
2 74 N. J. L. 785, 67 A. 77 (1907).
3 Cooper v. Philadelphia Worsted Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 622, reported as Lees
et al. v. Harding, Whitman & Co. in 60 A. 352 (1905).
4 Vidal v. South American Securities Co. et al., 276 F. 855 (1922).
5 See note in 24 Mich. L. Rev. 411 and cases there cited.
6 209 N. Y. 375, 103 N. E. 697 (1913).
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That this rule is applicable to certificates of stock was decided
in Direction Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel
Corporation.7 In that case the facts were that the defendants
were the Public Trustee, an English corporation appointed to be
custodian of enemy property, and the United States Steel Cor-
poration. The plaintiff, a German corporation, held the certifi-
cates for a hundred shares of United States Steel Corporation
stock. The English board lawfully authorized the Public Trustee
to seize this enemy property and vested the rights of the plaintiff
in the Public Trustee. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
court, said: "Therefore New Jersey, having authorized this cor-
poration, like others, to issue certificates that so far represent
the stock that ordinarily, at least, no one can get the benefits of
ownership except through and by means of the paper, it recog-
nizes as owner anyone to whom the person declared by the paper
to be owner has transferred it by the indorsement provided for,
wherever it takes place ...but the question who is the owner
of the paper depends upon the law of the place where the paper
is.... An execution locally valid is as effectual as an ordinary
purchase. "
In his book, The Transfer of Stock,8 Francis T. Christy, ap-
proving the decision in the Disconto case, declares: "The rule
was established that, as between the parties to a sale or transfer
of stock the law of the place where the sale or transfer is made
governs, but in respecL of the .alidity of the transfer as aganst
the corporation, the law of the domicile of the corporation
governs."
The Disconto case has become the leading case on the question,
and seems to settle decisively that certificates of stock have a
situs of their own. That this is logical will be conceded if we stop
to consider the important distinction between shares and certifi-
cates of stock. The shares of stock are not corporeal chattels, but
are in the nature of choses in action, and are intangible, incor-
poreal personal property.9 Being intangible and incorporeal, the
shares could not be said to have a situs of their own. But the
certificates are merely written evidence of the ownership of the
stock, and are not the shares. The certificates are, of course,
tangible. Being tangible, they may perceivably be deemed to
have a situs of their own.
T 267 U. S. 22, 45 S. Ct. 207, 69 L. Ed. 495 (1925).
8 (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1929), p. 118.
9 Norrie et al. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. et al., 7 F. (2d) 158
(1925).
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There is another ground of justification for this doctrine. This
was discussed in a note10 dealing with the Disconto case. It was
said that that case seemed to be supported by a sound line
of reasoning which compares certificates of stock to promissory
notes, which are treated as having a situs where they are found.
It has been said that a certificate of stock is merely the symbol
or paper evidence of the ownership of shares of stock and is not
in itself property, and has no extrinsic value disconnected from
the stock it represents, but is frequently treated in commercial
markets as having a value in itself as a transferable symbol of
property, like a negotiable instrument. Commercial usage iden-
tifies the share of stock with the certificate to such an extent that
the share is given a situs with the certificate. The certificate of
stock as distinguished from the shares of stock it represents, has
been held to be not only property but tangible personal
property.11
In Lohman v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company12 it
became necessary for the court to decide where certificates of
stock had their situs. The court overruled all prior contrary deci-
sions in Missouri and followed the Disconto case. Judge Blair,
who delivered the opinion, said: "The Disconto-Gesellshaft case
seems conclusively to establish the rule that shares of stock in a
corporation represented by appropriate certificates of stock, con-
stitute property in themselves, and not merely evidence of owner-
ship, and have a situs for some purposes elsewhere than in the
state where the corporation is domiciled. That case announces
the latest and the controlling rule of the United States Supreme
Court. "
In DeGanay v. Lederer13 the question before the court was as
to the situs of certificates of stocks and bonds. The court said:
"It is insisted that the maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam,
applies in this instance and that the situs of the property was
at the domicile of the owner in France. But this court has fre-
quently declared that the maxim, a fiction at most, must yield to
the facts and circumstances of cases which require it; and that
notes, bonds, and mortgages may acquire a situs at a place other
than the domicile of the owner. . . ." The court cited with ap-
proval the New York doctrine treating bonds, bills, and notes
10 39 Harv. L. Rev. 485.
11 Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 147 P. 722 (1915); Winslow v.
Fletcher, 53 Conn. 300, 4 A. 250 (1866).
12 326 Mo. 819, 33 S. W. (2d) 112 (1930).
18 250 U. S. 376, 39 S. Ct. 524, 63 L. Ed. 1042 (1919).
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as having a situs at the place where they are found like other
visible tangible chattels.
Goodrich, in his text,14 discussing the question of the situs of
intangibles, states as a general rule: "The validity of an assign-
ment of an intangible chose in action should . . . be determined
by the rule prevailing at the place where it is made." Then,
speaking of bills of exchange and promissory notes, he says,
"The paper on which the promise in the one case or the order in
the other is written may be only the evidence of the chose in
action in which the holder has 'property,' but such paper is
treated in the commercial world and by the law as having a
significance not given to the ordinary written evidence of a con-
tract of parties." He states the rule to be that the transfer
of such an instrument is to be governed by the rule regulating
the transfer of tangibles, the law of the situs of the instrument
at the time of the transfer.1 5
This is also the rule in England, first stated in Alcock v.
Smith.16 It was there held that the rule that the assignment of
a tangible movable, such as would give a good title thereto ac-
cording to the law of the country where the movable is situated
at the time of the assignment (lex situs) is valid, applies to a
bill of exchange and to any negotiable instrument. This case was
subsequently approved in Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank17
and is now the settled law in England.
The foregoing view is adopted in the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act.' 8 By that act title to the certificate and to the shares repre-
sented thereby can be transferred only by delivery of the certi-
ficate indorsed or by delivery of the certificate and a separate
written assignment of it. This is professedly an embodiment of
the mercantile theory. New York adopted the rule without
statute.
In Klein v. Wilson & Company, Inc.19 the court said: "Under
these provisions of the Uniform Stock Act, I conceive the stock
certificates to be more than mere evidence of interest in prop-
erty, and to be the concrete physical representation of such
14 Herbert F. Goodrich, Handbook on the Conflict of Laws, (St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 363-4.
15 See Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 173 N. E. 835(1930).
16 [1892] 1 Ch. 238.
17 [1905] 1 K. B. 677.
18 111. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 32, par. 229 et seq.
19 7 F. (2d) 769 (1924).
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interest, possessed of such characteristics and qualities as necessi-
tate an actual delivery thereof in order to transfer title to the
certificates themselves and the shares represented by them."
Since under the provisions of this act stock certificates are made
negotiable, the validity of any transfer of such certificates should
be governed by the same rule as governs the transfer of other
negotiable instruments, that is, the lex situs.
J. D. GANNON
